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EXPLOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE 1990s NASDAQ: WHEN DID EXUBERANCE
ESCALATE ASSET VALUES?*
BY PETER C. B. PHILLIPS, YANGRU WU, AND JUN YU1
Yale University, University of Auckland, University of Southampton, and Singapore
Management University; Rutgers University and Central University of Finance and Economics
(Chinese Academy of Finance and Development); Singapore Management University
A recursive test procedure is suggested that provides a mechanism for testing explosive behavior, date stamping
the origination and collapse of economic exuberance, and providing valid confidence intervals for explosive growth
rates. The method involves the recursive implementation of a right-side unit root test and a sup test, both of which are
easy to use in practical applications, and some new limit theory for mildly explosive processes. The test procedure is
shown to have discriminatory power in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles, thereby overcoming a weakness in
earlier applications of unit root tests for economic bubbles. An empirical application to the Nasdaq stock price index in
the 1990s provides confirmation of explosiveness and date stamps the origination of financial exuberance to mid-1995,
prior to the famous remark in December 1996 by Alan Greenspan about irrational exuberance in the financial market,
thereby giving the remark empirical content.
How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values? (Alan Greenspan,
1996)
Experience can be a powerful teacher. The rise and fall of internet stocks, which created and then
destroyed $8 trillion of shareholder wealth, has led a new generation of economists to acknowledge that
bubbles can occur. (Alan Krueger, 2005)
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, led by DotCom stocks and the internet sector, the U.S. stock market
experienced a spectacular rise in all major indices, especially the Nasdaq index. Concomitant
with this striking rise in stock market indices, there was much popular talk among economists
about the effects of the internet and computing technology on productivity and the emergence
of a “new economy” associated with these changes. What caused the unusual surge and fall in
prices, whether there were bubbles, and whether the bubbles were rational or behavioral are
among the most actively debated issues in macroeconomics and finance in recent years.
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FIGURE 1
TIME SERIES PLOTS OF REAL NASDAQ PRICE AND REAL NASDAQ DIVIDEND FROM FEBRUARY 1973 TO JUNE 2005. BOTH SERIES ARE
NORMALIZED TO 100 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SAMPLE
Many researchers attribute the episode to financial bubbles. Examples include Greenspan
(1996), Thaler (1999), Shiller (2000), The Economist (2000), Cooper et al. (2001), Ritter and
Welch (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Cunado et al.
(2005).2 Among the many references, the remark by Greenspan (1996) on December 5, 1996,
is the most celebrated, involving as it did the coining of the phrase “irrational exuberance” to
characterize herd stock market behavior, a phrase that remains the most oft-quoted remark of
the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The remark has been influential in thinking
about financial markets and herd behavior, and it also had some short-term market effects.
Indeed, immediately after Greenspan coined the phrase in a dinner party speech, stock markets
fell sharply worldwide the next day.3 However, in spite of this correction, theGreenspan remark
did not halt the general upward march of the United States market. On the contrary, over the
full decade of the 1990s, the Nasdaq index rose to the historical high of 5,048.62 points onMarch
10, 2000 from 329.80 on October 31, 1990 (see Figure 1).
One purpose of the present article is to examine empirically the Nasdaq market performance
in relation to the market perceptions of exuberance by Greenspan and other commentators.
In particular, it is of interest to determine whether the Greenspan perception of exuberance
was supported by empirical evidence in the data or if Greenspan actually foresaw the outbreak
of exuberance and its dangers when he made the remark. To achieve this goal, we first define
financial exuberance in the time series context in terms of explosive autoregressive behavior
and then introduce some new econometric methodology based on forward recursive regression
tests and mildly explosive regression asymptotics to assess the empirical evidence of exuberant
behavior in the Nasdaq stock market index. In this context, the approach is compatible with
several different explanations of this period of market activity, including the rational bubble
literature, herd behavior, and exuberant and rational responses to economic fundamentals.
All these propagating mechanisms can lead to explosive characteristics in the data. Hence,
the empirical issue becomes one of identifying the origination, termination, and extent of
2 Some economists have also sought to rationalize the equity boom using a variety of economic variables, including
uncertainty about firm profitability (Pa´stor andVeronesi, 2006), decliningmacroeconomic risk (Lettau et al., 2008), high
and volatile revenue growth (Schwartz andMoon, 2000), learning (Pa´stor andVeronesi, 2009), and other fundamentals.
3 For example, the stock markets in Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, Toyko, and the United States fell by 4%, 3%,
4%, 3%, and 2%, respectively.
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the explosive behavior. Although with traditional test procedures “there is little evidence of
explosive behavior” (Campbell et al., 1997, p. 260), with the recursive procedure, we successfully
document explosive periods of price exuberance in the Nasdaq.
Among the potential explanations of explosive behavior in economic variables, the most
prominent are perhaps models with rational bubbles. Accordingly, we relate our analysis of
explosive behavior to the rational bubble literature, where it is well known that standard econo-
metric tests encounter difficulties in identifying rational asset bubbles (Flood and Garber, 1980;
Flood and Hodrick, 1986; Evans, 1991). The use of recursive tests enables us to locate explod-
ing subsamples of data and detect periods of exuberance. The econometric approach utilizes
some new machinery that permits the construction of valid asymptotic confidence intervals for
explosive autoregressive processes and tests of explosive characteristics in time series data. This
approach can detect the presence of exuberance in the data and date stamp the origination and
collapse of periods of exuberance.
We apply our econometric approach to the Nasdaq index over the full sample period from
1973 to 2005 and some subperiods. Using the forward recursive regression technique, we date
stamp the origin and conclusion of the explosive behavior. To answer the question raised
by Greenspan in the first epigraph in this article, we match the empirical time stamp of the
origination against the dating of Greenspan’s remark. The statistical evidence from these meth-
ods indicates that explosiveness started in 1995, thereby predating and providing empirical
content to the Greenspan remark in December 1996. The empirical evidence indicates that
the explosive environment continued until sometime between September 2000 and March
2001.
If the discount rate is time invariant, the identification of explosive characteristics in the
data is equivalent to the detection of a stock bubble, as argued in Diba and Grossman (1987,
1988). Using standard unit root tests applied to real U.S. Standard and Poor’s Composite Stock
Price Index data over the period 1871–1986, Diba and Grossman (1988) tested levels and dif-
ferences of stock prices for nonstationarity, finding support in the data for nonstationarity in
levels but stationarity in differences. Since differences of an explosive process still manifest
explosive characteristics, these findings appear to reject the presence of a market bubble in
the data. Although the results were less definitive, further tests by Diba and Grossman (1988)
provided confirmation of cointegration between stock prices and dividends over the same pe-
riod, supporting the conclusion that prices did not diverge from long-run fundamentals and
thereby giving additional evidence against bubble behavior. Evans (1991) criticized this ap-
proach, showing that time series simulated from a nonlinear model that produces periodically
collapsing bubbles manifests more complex bubble characteristics that are typically not uncov-
erable by standard unit root and cointegration tests. He concluded that standard unit root and
cointegration tests are inappropriate tools for detecting bubble behavior because they cannot
effectively distinguish between a stationary process and a periodically collapsing bubble model.
Patterns of periodically collapsing bubbles in the data lookmore like data generated from a unit
root or stationary autoregression than a potentially explosive process. Recursive tests of the
type undertaken in our article are not subject to the same criticism and, as demonstrated in our
analysis and simulations reported below, are capable of distinguishing periodically collapsing
bubbles from pure unit root processes.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 defines market exuberance,
discusses model specification issues, and relates exuberance to the earlier literature on rational
bubbles. Section 3 discusses some econometric issues, such as finite sample estimation bias and
the construction of valid asymptotic confidence intervals for mildly explosive processes. Section
4 describes the data used in this study. The empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6
documents the finite sample properties of our tests and develops some asymptotic properties
of the Evans (1991) model of periodically collapsing bubbles. Simulations with these models
are conducted and the finite sample properties of the tests are analyzed. Section 7 concludes.
The Appendix provides a mathematical analysis of the periodically collapsing bubble model of
Evans.
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FIGURE 2
TYPICAL STATIONARY, RANDOM WALK, AND EXPLOSIVE AUTOREGRESSIVE TRAJECTORIES
2. SPECIFICATION ISSUES
When Greenspan coined “irrational exuberance,” the phrase was not defined—see the first
epigraph in this article. Instead, the appellation can be interpreted as a typically cryptic warning
that the market might be overvalued and in risk of a financial bubble. In the event, as the second
epigraph in this article indicates, the subsequent rise and fall of internet stocks to the extent
of $8 trillion of shareholder wealth renewed a long-standing interest among economists in the
possibility of financial bubbles. Theoretical studies on rational bubbles in the stock market
include Blanchard (1979), Blanchard and Watson (1982), Shiller (1984), Tirole (1982, 1985),
Evans (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (1992), and Olivier (2000), among many others, and
empirical studies include Shiller (1981), West (1987, 1988), Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1989),
Diba and Grossman (1988), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), and Wu (1997). Flood and Hodrick
(1990) and Gurkaynak (2005) survey existing econometric methodologies and test results for
financial bubbles.
It is well known in the rational bubble literature that bubbles, if they are present, should
manifest explosive characteristics in prices. This statistical property motivates a definition of
exuberance in terms of explosive autoregressive behavior propagated by a process of the form
xt = μx + δxt−1 + εx,t where for certain subperiods of the data δ > 1. Figure 2 gives typical time
series plots for stationary (δ = 0.9), random walk (δ = 1.0), and explosive processes (δ = 1.02)
with interceptμx = 0 and inputs εx,t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1). The differences in the trajectories are quite
apparent.
The concept of rational bubbles can be illustrated using the present value theory of finance
whereby fundamental asset prices are determined by the sum of the present discounted values
of expected future dividend sequence. Most tests begin with the standard no arbitrage condition
below:
Pt = 11 + REt(Pt+1 + Dt+1),(1)
where Pt is the real stock price (ex-dividend) at time t,Dt is the real dividend received from
the asset for ownership between t − 1 and t, and R is the discount rate (R > 0). This section
assumesR to be time invariant. However, making the discount rate stationary and time-varying
does not change the implication of submartingale (explosive) behavior given in (4) below, but
complicates the analysis of the rational bubble solution.
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We follow Campbell and Shiller (1989) by taking a log-linear approximation of (1), which
yields the following solution through recursive substitution:4
pt = pft + bt,(2)
where
pft =
κ − γ
1 − ρ + (1 − ρ)
∞∑
i=0
ρiEtdt+1+i,(3)
bt = lim
i→∞
ρiEtpt+i,
Et(bt+1) = 1
ρ
bt = (1 + exp(d − p))bt,(4)
with pt = log(Pt),dt = log(Dt), γ = log(1 + R)ρ = 1/(1 + exp(d − p)), with d − p being the
average log dividend–price ratio, and
κ = − log(ρ) − (1 − ρ) log
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
.
Obviously, 0 < ρ < 1. Following convention, we call pft , which is exclusively determined by
expected dividends, the fundamental component of the stock price, and bt, which satisfies the
difference equation (5) below, the rational bubble component. Both components are expressed
in natural logarithms. As exp(d − p) > 0, the rational bubble bt is a submartingale and is
explosive in expectation. Equation (4) implies the following process:
bt = 1
ρ
bt−1 + εb,t ≡ (1 + g)bt−1 + εb,t, Et−1(εb,t) = 0,(5)
where g = 1
ρ
− 1 = exp(d − p) > 0 is the growth rate of the natural logarithm of the bubble
and εb,t is a martingale difference.
As evident from (2), the stochastic properties of pt are determined by those of p
f
t and bt. In
the absence of bubbles, i.e., bt = 0, ∀t, we will have pt = pft , and pt is determined solely by pft
and hence by dt. In this case, from (3), we obtain
dt − pt = −κ − γ1 − ρ −
∞∑
i=0
ρiEt(dt+1+i).(6)
If pt and dt are both integrated processes of order one, denoted by I(1), then (6) implies that pt
and dt are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector [1,−1].
If bubbles are present, i.e., bt 	= 0, since (5) implies explosive behavior in bt, pt will also
be explosive by Equation (2), irrespective of whether dt is an integrated process, I(1), or a
stationary process, denoted by I(0). In this case, pt is also explosive and therefore cannot be
4 Although log-linear approximations of this type about the samplemean are commonly employed in both theoretical
and empirical work, we remark that they may be less satisfactory in nonstationary contexts where the sample means
do not converge to population constants. We therefore used the series both in log levels and in levels in our empirical
work and found very similar results for both cases.
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stationary. This implication motivated Diba and Grossman (1988) to look for the presence of
bubble behavior by applying unit root tests to pt. Finding an empirical rejection of the null of
a unit root inpt, Diba andGrossman (1988) concluded that pt was not explosive and therefore
there was no bubble in the stock market.
In the case where dt is I(1) and hence dt is I(0), Equation (6) motivated Diba and Gross-
man (1988) to look for evidence of the absence of bubbles by testing for a cointegrating
relation between pt and dt. In the presence of bubbles, pt is always explosive and hence can-
not co-move or be cointegrated with dt if dt is itself not explosive. Therefore, an empirical
finding of cointegration between pt and dt may be taken as evidence against the presence of
bubbles.
Evans (1991) questioned the validity of the empirical tests employed by Diba and Grossman
(1988) by arguing that none of these tests have much power to detect periodically collapsing
bubbles. He demonstrated by simulation that the low power of standard unit root and coin-
tegration tests in this context is due to the fact that a periodically collapsing bubble process
can behave much like an I(1) process or even like a stationary linear autoregressive process
provided that the probability of collapse of the bubble is not negligible. As a result, Evans (1991,
p. 927) claimed that “periodically collapsing bubbles are not detectable by using standard tests.”
Equations (5) and (2) suggest that a direct way to test for bubbles is to examine evidence for
explosive behavior in pt and dt when the discount rate is time invariant. Of course, explosive
characteristics in pt could in principle arise from dt and the two processes would then be
explosively cointegrated. However, if dt is demonstrated to be nonexplosive, then the explosive
behavior in pt will provide sufficient evidence for the presence of bubbles because the observed
behavior may only arise through the presence of bt. Of course, it seems likely that in practice
explosive behavior in pt may only be temporary or short-lived, as in the case of stock market
bubbles that collapse after a certain period of time. Some of these possibilities can be taken into
account empirically by looking at subsamples of the data.
Looking directly for explosive behavior in pt and nonexplosive behavior in dt via right-tailed
unit root tests is one aspect of the empirical methodology of this article. Although this approach
is straightforward, it has received little attention in the literature. One possible explanation
is the consensus view that “empirically there is little evidence of explosive behavior” in stock
prices, as noted in Campbell et al. (1997, p. 260) for instance. However, as Evans (1991) noted,
explosive behavior is only temporary when economic bubbles periodically collapse, and in such
cases the observed trajectories may appear more like an I(1) or even stationary series than
an explosive series, thereby confounding empirical evidence. He demonstrated by simulation
that standard unit root tests had difficulties in detecting such periodically collapsing bubbles.
In order for unit root test procedures to be powerful in detecting explosiveness, we propose
the use of recursive regression techniques and show below by analytic methods and simulations
that this approach is effective in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles. Using these methods,
the present article finds that when recursive tests are conducted and data from the 1990s are
included in the sample, some strong evidence of explosive characteristics in pt emerges.
Our tests are implemented as follows. For each time series xt (log stock price or log dividend),
we apply the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root against the alternative of an
explosive root (the right-tailed). That is, we estimate the following autoregressive specification
by least squares5:
xt = μx + δxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
φjxt−j + εx,t, εx,t ∼ NID (0, σ2x),(7)
5 We also implemented the Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) tests and obtained results very similar to
the ADF test.
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for some given value of the lag parameter J, where NID denotes independent and normal
distribution.6 In our empirical application we use significance tests to determine the lag order
J , as suggested in Campbell and Perron (1991). The unit root null hypothesis is H0 : δ = 1 and
the right-tailed alternative hypothesis is H1 : δ > 1.
In forward recursive regressions, model (7) is estimated repeatedly, using subsets of the
sample data incremented by one observation at each pass. If the first regression involves τ0 =
[nr0] observations, for some fraction r0 of the total samplewhere [ ] signifies the integer part of its
argument, subsequent regressions employ this originating data set supplemented by successive
observations giving a sample of size τ = [nr] for r0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Denote the corresponding t-statistic
by ADFr and hence ADF1 corresponds to the full sample. Under the null we have
ADFr ⇒
∫ r
0
W˜dW(∫ r
0
W˜2
)1/2 ,
and
sup
r∈[r0,1]
ADFr ⇒ sup
r∈[r0,1]
∫ r
0
W˜dW(∫ r
0
W˜2
)1/2 ,
where W is the standard Brownian motion and W˜(r) = W(r) − 1r
∫ 1
0 W is demeaned Brownian
motion.7
Comparison of supr ADFr with the right-tailed critical values from
supr∈[r0,1]
∫ r
0 W˜dW/
(∫ r
0 W˜
2
)1/2
makes it possible to test for a unit root against explosive-
ness. However, this testing procedure cannot date stamp the emergence or collapse of
exuberance. To locate the origin and the conclusion of exuberance, one can match the time
series of the recursive test statistic ADFr, with r ∈ [r0, 1], against the right-tailed critical values
of the asymptotic distribution of the standard Dickey–Fuller t-statistic. In particular, if re is
the origination date and rf is the collapse date of explosive behavior in the data, we construct
estimates of these dates as follows:
rˆe = inf
s≥r0
{
s : ADFs > cvadfβn (s)
}
, rˆf = inf
s≥rˆe
{
s : ADFs < cvadfβn (s)
}
,(8)
where cvadfβn (s) is the right-side critical value of ADFs corresponding to a significance level
of βn. In practice, it is conventional to set the significance level in the 1–5% range. But to
achieve consistent estimation of the date stamps
{
rˆe, rˆf
}
, the significance level βn needs to
approach zero asymptotically, and correspondingly cvadfβn (s) must diverge to infinity in order to
eliminate the type I error as n → ∞. We therefore let βn depend on n in the above formulas.
In our practical work reported below it is convenient to use a direct setting and expansion rate
for the critical value of cvadfβn (s) instead of an explicit setting for βn. The setting employed is
cvadfβn (s) = log(log(ns))/100. For the sample sizes considered in our empirical application, this
setting leads to critical values around the 4% significance level. This date stamping procedure
6 The asymptotic theory developed below does not require the normality assumption, whereas the bias correction
explained later does use the distributional assumption.
7 Observe that, given the limiting Brownian motion process
{
W (r) : r ∈ [0, 1]}, the limiting variate ξ (r) =∫ r
0 WdW/
(∫ r
0 W
2
)1/2
corresponding toADFr is a stochastic process that evolves with r. However, the finite dimensional
distribution of ξ (r) given r is the same for all r > 0 and is the usual unit root limit distribution
∫ 1
0 WdW/
(∫ 1
0 W
2
)1/2
.
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has some good properties and, in particular, enables the consistent estimation of origination
and collapse dates, as discussed below. In general, of course, the lower the actual p-value of the
observed ADFr, the stronger the empirical evidence for explosive behavior.
If these tests lead to a rejection ofH0 in favor ofH1, then wemay construct a valid asymptotic
confidence interval for δ using some new econometric theory for the explosive case, as explained
in Section 3.
3. ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
3.1. Econometric Analysis of Explosive Processes. Recent work by Phillips andMagdalinos
(2007a,b) has provided an asymptotic distribution theory for mildly explosive processes that
can be used for confidence interval construction in the present context. These papers deal with
an explosive model of the form
xt = δnxt−1 + εx,t, t = 1, . . . ,n; δn = 1 + ckn , c > 0,(9)
which is initialized at some x0 = op
(√
kn
)
independent of
{
εx,t, t ≥ 1
}
, and where (kn)n≥1 is a
sequence increasing to ∞ such that kn = o (n) as n → ∞. The error process εx,t may comprise
either independent and identically distributed random variables or a weakly dependent time
series with Eεx,t = 0 and uniform finite second moments so that supt Eε2x,t < ∞. Model (9)
does not include an intercept in order to avoid the presence of a deterministically explosive
component in xt.
The sequence δn = 1 + ckn > 1 is local to the origin in the sense that δn → 1 as n → ∞, but
for any finite n it involves moderate deviations from a unit root, i.e., deviations that are greater
than the conventional O
(
n−1
)
deviations for which unit root tests have nontrivial local power
properties (see Phillips, 1987) and unit root type distributions apply. The corresponding time
series (which is strictly speaking an array process) xt in (9) is mildly explosive. Importantly, kn
may be within a slowly varying factor of n, for instance log n, so that we may have kn = n/ log n.
Models of the form (9) seem well suited to capturing the essential features of economic and
financial time series that undergo mildly explosive behavior. They also seem appropriate for
capturing periodically collapsing bubble behavior where the bubble may appear over a subpe-
riod of length kn < n. These mildly explosive models have the very interesting and somewhat
unexpected property, established in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a,b), that they are amenable
to central limit theory. Moreover, the limit theory turns out to be invariant to the short mem-
ory properties of the innovations εx,t, so that inferential procedures based on this limit theory
are robust to many different departures from simple i.i.d. errors. This means that the models
and the limit theory may be used as a basis for statistical inference with processes that mani-
fest mildly explosive trajectories. For economic and financial data, this typically means values
of δn that are in the region [1.005, 1.05]. In particular, if kn = n/ logn and n = 200, we have
δn = 1 + ckn ∈ [1.002, 1.053] for c ∈ [0.1, 2].
Under some general regularity conditions, Phillips andMagdalinos show that the least squares
regression estimator δˆn =
∑n
t=1 xt−1xt/
∑n
t=1 x
2
t−1 has the following limit theory for mildly explo-
sive processes of the form (9):
kn(δn)n
2c
(δˆn − δn) =⇒ C, and (δn)
n
(δn)2 − 1
(
δˆn − δn
) =⇒ C,
whereC is a standardCauchy randomvariable. It follows that a 100(1 − α)% confidence interval
for δn is given by the region
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δˆn ± (δˆn)
2 − 1
(δˆn)n
Cα
)
,
where Cα is the two-tailed α percentile critical value of the standard Cauchy distribution. For
90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals, these critical values are as follows:
C0.10 = 6.315, C0.05 = 12.7, C0.01 = 63.65674.
These values can be compared with the corresponding Gaussian critical values of 1.645, 1.96,
2.576.
The confidence intervals and limit theory are invariant to the initial condition x0 being any
fixed constant value or random process of smaller asymptotic order than k1/2n . The confidence
intervals and limit theory also remain unchanged if the data-generating process is a unit root
model followed by a mildly explosive autoregression such as (9). These properties provide
further robustness to the procedure.
3.2. Finite Sample Bias Correction via Indirect Inference Estimation. Least squares (LS)
regression is well known to produce downward biased coefficient estimates in the first-order
autoregression (AR). This bias does not go to zero as the AR coefficient δ → 0 and the bias
increases as δ gets larger. It is therefore helpful to take account of this bias in conducting
inference on autoregressive coefficients such as δ in (9). Several statistical procedures are
available for doing so, including the use of asymptotic expansion formulas (Kendall, 1954),
jackknifing (Quenouille, 1956; Efron, 1982), median unbiased estimation (Andrews, 1993), and
indirect inference (MacKinnon and Smith, 1998; Gourie´roux et al., 2000).
Indirect inference was originally suggested and has been found to be highly useful when
the moments and the likelihood function of the true model are difficult to deal with, but the
true model is amenable to data simulation (Smith, 1993; Gourie´roux et al., 1993). In fact, the
procedure also produces improved small sample properties and has the capacity to reduce
autoregressive bias, as shown by MacKinnon and Smith (1998) and Gourie´roux et al. (2000)
in the time series context and Gourie´roux et al. (2010) in the dynamic panel context. We
shall use indirect inference in the present application because of its known good performance
characteristics and convenience in autoregressive model estimation.
To illustrate, suppose we need to estimate the parameter δ in the simple AR(1) model (i.e.,
J = 0 in model (7)8):
xt = μx + δxt−1 + εx,t, εx,t ∼ NID
(
0, σ2x
)
,(10)
from observations {xt; t ≤ n}, where the true value of δ is δ0. Some autoregressive bias reduction
methods, such as Kendall’s (1954) procedure, require explicit knowledge of the first term of
the asymptotic expansion of the bias in powers of n−1. Such explicit knowledge of the bias
is not needed in indirect inference. Instead, indirect inference calibrates the bias function by
simulation. The idea is as follows. When applying LS to estimate the AR(1) model with the
observed data, we obtain the estimate δˆLSn and can think of this estimate and its properties
(including bias) as being dependent on δ through the data. Given a parameter choice δ, let
{x˜ht (δ) ; t ≤ n} be data simulated from the true model, for h = 1, . . . ,H with H being the total
number of simulated paths. These simulations rely on the distributional assumption made in
(10). Let the LS estimator based on the hth simulated path, given δ, be denoted by δ˜hn(δ).
8 When J > 0, we need to augment model (10) accordingly.
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The indirect inference estimator is defined as the extremum estimator
δˆIIn,H = argmin
δ∈
‖ δˆLSn −
1
H
H∑
h=1
δ˜hn(δ) ‖,(11)
where ‖ · ‖ is some finite dimensional distance metric and  is the parameter space, which is
compact. In the case where H tends to infinity, the indirect inference estimator becomes
δˆIIn = argmin
δ∈
‖ δˆLSn − qn(δ) ‖,(12)
where qn(δ) = E(˜δhn(δ)) is the so-called binding function. In this case, assuming the function qn
to be invertible, the indirect inference estimator is given by
δˆIIn = q−1n (δˆLSn ).
The procedure essentially builds in a small-sample bias correction to parameter estimation, with
the bias being computed directly by simulation.
It can be shown that the asymptotic distribution of δˆIIn is the same as that of δˆ
LS
n as n → ∞ and
H → ∞. So the asymptotic confidence interval derived in the previous section applies equally
well to the indirect inference estimator and will be implemented in what follows.
3.3. Estimating Origination and Collapse Dates. As explained earlier, date stamping the
beginning and conclusion of explosive behavior in the data is based on the criteria (8), leading
to the point estimates
{
rˆe, rˆf
}
. It is clearly desirable for these point estimates to be consistent
for the true values as the sample size n → ∞. Asymptotic analysis of {rˆe, rˆf } depends on the
form of the true model under both the null and the alternative hypothesis. Since the null is that
of a unit root model with no period of explosive behavior, it is the alternative hypothesis that is
of primary interest.
Note that under the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior, if βn → 0 as n → ∞, then
cvadfβn → ∞. It follows that under that null
lim
n→∞P
(
ADFs > cvadfβn (s)
) = P
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
∫ s
0
W˜dW(∫ s
0
W˜2
)1/2 = ∞
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = 0.(13)
Hence, in the limit as n → ∞ under the null, there will be no origination point for an explosive
period in the data.
In order to consistently estimate the origination and collapse dates of explosiveness under
the alternative, we must specify a model that allows for regimes that switch between the unit
root and mildly explosive episodes. For the purpose of the discussion that follows, we use a
data-generating mechanism that allows for the possibility of a single explosive episode, viz.,
xt = xt−11 {t < τe} + δnxt−11
{
τe ≤ t ≤ τf
}
+
⎛⎝ t∑
k=τf +1
εk + x∗τf
⎞⎠ 1 {t > τf }+ εt 1 {t ≤ τf }
δn = 1 + cnα , c > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) ,
(14)
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where εx,t is i.i.d.
(
0, σ2
)
, τe = [nre] is the origination date, and τf = [nrf ] is the collapse date of
the explosive episode. If there is no mildly explosive episode, then c = 0 and δn = 1. Model (14)
starts with a unit root model but allows for switches in regime at τe (to the explosive episode)
and τf (back to unit root behavior). When the explosive period comes to the end, the initial
value of the new unit root period differs from the end value of the explosive period. So the
specification captures both exuberance and collapse and involves reinitialization of the process
under the collapse. With the reinitialization at τf , the process jumps to a different level x∗τf .
The new initial value x∗τf may be related to the earlier period of martingale behavior in the
process, perhaps with some random deviation, in which case we would have x∗τf = xτe + x∗ for
someOp (1) random quantity x∗. A detailed analysis of this model and the asymptotic behavior
of a test procedure for date stamping explosive behavior is given in Phillips and Yu (2009). We
summarize those findings in what follows here.
Although the mechanism of collapse is very simple in Model (14), the specification may be
further adapted to allow for a short period transitional dynamic, which could be mean reverting
to the level X∗τf .
Recursive regressions are run with (14) using the data
{
xt : t = 1, 2, . . . , τ = [nr]
}
with r ≥ r0,
so that the minimum amount of data used for the regressions is τ0 = [nr0].9 According to (8),
we date the origination of the explosive episode as τˆe = [nrˆe] where
rˆe = inf
s≥r0
{
s : ADFs > cvadfβn (s)
}
,(15)
and cvadfβn (s) is the right-side 100βn% critical value of the limit distribution
∫ s
0 W˜dW/
(∫ s
0 W˜
2
)1/2
of the ADFs statistic based on τs = [ns] observations and βn is the size of the one-sided test.
For r < re it is easy to show that P {rˆe < r} → 0, as n → ∞, just as under the null. Denote
xj−1 − τ−1
∑τ
i=1 xi−1 by x˜j−1. When τ = [nr] and r > re, we find by examining the dominant
components in the numerator and denominator of the recursive coefficient estimator δˆn (τ) =∑τ
j=1 x˜j x˜j−1/
∑τ
j=1 x˜
2
j−1 that
n(1+α)/2δτ−τen
2c
(
δˆn (τ) − δn
) =
δ
−(τ−τe)
n
nα/2+1/2
τ∑
j=τe
xj−1εj
{
1 + op (1)
}
2cδ−2(τ−τe)n
n1+α
τ∑
j=τe
x2j−1
{
1 + op (1)
} =⇒ C,(16)
where the limitC is a Cauchy variate (cf., theorem 4.3 of Phillips andMagdalinos, 2007a). Then,
since α ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 we have
τ
(
δˆn (τ) − 1
) = τ (δˆn (τ) − δn)+ τ (δn − 1)
= τ (δn − 1) + op
(
τ
n(1+α)/2δτ−τen
)
= n1−αrc + op (1) → ∞,
(17)
9 For convenience of presentation, it is assumed in this section that the lag length J = 0.
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and the DF t-statistic is⎛⎜⎜⎝
τ∑
j=1
x˜2j−1
σˆ2τ
⎞⎟⎟⎠
1/2
(δˆn(τ) − 1) =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
τ−2
τ∑
j=1
x˜2j−1
σˆ2τ
⎞⎟⎟⎠
1/2
τ(δˆn(τ) − 1)
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
nαδ2(τ−τe)n
τ22c
x˜2τe
δ
2(τ−τe)
n re
τ2c2r
x˜2τe
⎞⎟⎟⎠
1/2
n1−αrc{1 + op (1)}
= n1−α/2 c
3/2r3/2
21/2r1/2e
{1 + op (1)},
(18)
where σˆ2τ is the usual least squares residual variance estimator.
We deduce from (18) that for all τ = [nr] and r > re
P
(
ADFr > cvadfβn (r)
) → 1,(19)
provided
cvadfβn
n1−α/2 → 0. According to (15) we have rˆe = infs≥r0{s : ADFs > cvadfβn (s)}. It follows that
for any η > 0
P {rˆe > re + η} → 0,
since P(ADFre+aη > cv
adf
βn
(re + aη)) → 1 for all 0 < aη < η. Since η > 0 is arbitrary and since
P {rˆe < re} → 0 as shown earlier, we deduce that P {|rˆe − re| > η} → 0 as n → ∞, provided
1
cvadfβn (r)
+ cv
adf
βn
(r)
n1−α/2
→ 0,(20)
for all r ∈ [r0, 1]. Hence, as n → ∞
rˆe = inf
s
{
s : ADFs > cvadfβn (s); s ∈ [r0, 1]
} →p re.
Condition (20) seems a mild condition on the critical value. In particular, cvadfβn (s) is required
to go to infinity (to ensure the type I error is negligible asymptotically) and at a slower rate
than n1−α/2 as n → ∞. Accordingly, any slowly varying expansion rate for cvadfβn (s), such as
c(log(log(n)))2, will suffice, for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Conditional on finding some originating date rˆe for explosive behavior, we date the collapse
of the explosive episode by τˆf = [nrˆf ] where10
rˆf = inf
s≥rˆe
{
s : ADFs < cvadfβn (s)
}
.(21)
Using a analysis similar to that for rˆe, Phillips and Yu (2009) show that rˆf →p rf , provided
cvadfβn (r) → ∞ for all r ∈ [r0, 1]. Hence, under some mild regularity and rate conditions, the
recursive ADF procedure consistently estimates the origination and collapse dates of explosive
10 It can also be useful to impose a minimum duration requirement such as s ≥ rˆe + log(n)n in condition (21), so that
only bubbles of reasonable duration (i.e., greater than a very small infinity as n → ∞) are detected in the test.
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TABLE 1
TESTING FOR EXPLOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE NASDAQ INDEX FROM FEBRUARY 1973 TO JUNE 2005
ADF1 supr∈[r0,1] ADFr
Log price pt −0.826 2.894
Log dividend dt −1.348 −1.018
Critical Values for the Explosive Alternative
1% 0.60 2.094
4% 0.01 1.552
5% −0.08 1.468
10% −0.44 1.184
NOTE: This table reports ADF1 and supr∈[r0,1] ADFr tests of the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of
an explosive root, where r0 = 0.10. The optimal lag length for theADF test is selected according to top-down sequential
significance testing, as suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991), with the maximum lag set to 12 and the significant
level set to 5%. The series are the log real Nasdaq price index and log real Nasdaq dividend. The sample period is
February 1973 to June 2005 with 389monthly observations. The critical values for theADF statistic and supr∈[r0,1] ADFr
are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications.
behavior. This result is not surprising. The reason is that when xt collapses to a level within an
Op (1) neighborhood of xτe the signal in the data from the explosive period is strong enough to
determine the asymptotics, as shown in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a) in a similar context. In
fact, in this case δˆn (τ) →p 1when τ > τf but there is a downward bias in the limiting distribution.
The formulation (14) is related to the Markov switching model of Hall et al. (1999). An
important difference between the two approaches is that we do not specify the mechanism for
regime switching whereas in Hall et al., nature selects the regime (or state, as represented by
st = 0 or 1) at date t with a probability that depends on what regime the process was in at date
t − 1. Our approach allows us to estimate the origination and conclusion dates whereas the
Markov switching model can estimate the filtered or smoothed probability of the state variable
st. It is reasonable to believe that the p-value of the one-sidedADFr test is negatively related to
theE(st|It)(=Pr(st = 1|It)), the filtered probability of being in the explosive state in theMarkov
regime switching model.
4. DATA
Our data are taken from Datastream International. We collect monthly observations on the
Nasdaq composite price index (without dividends) and the Nasdaq composite dividend yields,
and compute theNasdaq composite dividend series from these two series.We use the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), which is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, to convert
nominal series to real series. Our sample covers the period from February 1973 to June 2005
and comprises 389 monthly observations.
Figure 1 plots the time series trajectories of the Nasdaq real price and real dividend indices.
Both series are normalized to 100 at the beginning of the sample. As can be seen, both price
and dividend grew steadily from the beginning of the sample until the early 1990s. The price
series then began to surge, and the steep upward movement in the series continued until the
late 1990s as investment in DotCom stocks grew in popularity. Early in the year 2000 the price
abruptly dropped and continued to fall to the mid-1990s level. The dividend series, on the other
hand, remained steady throughout the sample period.
5. TESTING AND DATING EXUBERANCE
Table 1 reports theADF1 and supr∈[r0,1] ADFr test statistics for both the log Nasdaq real price
and logNasdaq real dividend indices for the full sample fromFebruary 1973 to June 2005, where
r0 = 0.10 (i.e., the initial start-up sample has 39 observations). Also reported are the various
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FIGURE 3
TIME SERIES OF ADFr T-STATISTIC FOR THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ PRICE AND THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ DIVIDEND
(r0 = 0.1) FROM APRIL 1976 TO JUNE 2005. ADFr T-STATISTIC IS OBTAINED FROM THE FORWARD RECURSIVE REGRESSION WITH
THE FIRST OBSERVATION IN FEBRUARY 1973
critical values for each of the two tests. For the ADF1 test, the asymptotic critical values are
obtained from Monte Carlo simulation and are consistent with those reported by Fuller (1996,
table 10.A.2). For supr∈[r0,1] ADFr, the critical values are obtained usingMonte Carlo simulation
based on 10,000 replications.
Several conclusions are drawn from the table. First, if we were to follow the convention and
apply the ADF test to the full sample (February 1973 to June 2005), the tests could not reject
the null hypothesisH0 : δ = 1 in favor of the right-tailed alternative hypothesisH1 : δ > 1 at the
5% significance level for the price series, and therefore one would conclude that there were no
significant evidence of exuberance in the price data. If one believes in a constant discount rate,
the result is consistent with Diba and Grossman (1988) and is subject to the criticism leveled
by Evans (1991) because standard unit root tests for the full sample naturally have difficulty in
detecting periodically collapsing bubbles. Second, the supr∈[r0,1] ADFr test, on the other hand,
provides significant evidence of explosiveness in the price data at the 1% level, suggesting the
presence of price exuberance, but no evidence in the dividend data. However, supr∈[r0,1] ADFr
cannot reveal the location of the exuberance.
To locate the origin and the conclusionof exuberance, Figure 3 plots the recursiveADFr statis-
tics for the log real price and the log real dividend.11 Also plotted is the curve log(log(ns))/100,
with s ∈ [0.1, 1] and n = 389, that is used for the critical values cvadfβn (s). Since ns ranges between
39 and 389, log(log(ns))/100 ranges between 0.013 and 0.018. These values of cvadfβn (s) turn out
to be close to the 4% significance level critical point. Obviously, these critical values go to
infinity as a slower rate than n1−α and δnn as n → ∞. The optimal lag length is determined using
the procedure suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991).12 Starting with 12 lags in the model,
coefficients are sequentially tested for significance at the 5% level, leading to the selection of
11 We have also conducted the tests using price and dividend series in levels instead of in natural logarithms. The
results are similar and the conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged. They are not reported to conserve space and
are available upon request. The same remark applies to Figures 4 and 5 discussed below as well.
12 The procedure of Campbell and Perron involves two steps. Following a suggestion of a referee, we estimated the
lag length and the autoregressive parameters in one step via the Lasso-type method (Knight and Fu, 2000; Caner and
Knight, 2008) and found the point estimates of δ in (7) are nearly identical by the two methods. To the best of our
knowledge, the asymptotic theory is not yet known for the Lasso estimator of δ in a mixed set of unit root and explosive
variables, thereby inhibiting inference with this procedure.
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FIGURE 4
TIME SERIES OF ADFr T-STATISTIC FOR THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ PRICE AND THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ DIVIDEND
FROM JUNE 1979 TO JUNE 2005. ADFr T-STATISTIC IS OBTAINED FROM THE ROLLING REGRESSION WITH THE FIRST SAMPLE
RANGING FROM FEBRUARY 1973 TO JUNE 1979 (NAMELY, 77 OBSERVATIONS ARE USED IN EACH REGRESSION)
the model for which the coefficient of the last included lag is significant at the 5% level.13 The
initial start-up sample for the recursive regression covers the period from February 1973 to
April 1976 (10% of the full sample).
The forward recursive regressions give some interesting new findings (see Figure 3). The
dividend series is always nonexplosive. The stock price series is also tested to be nonexplosive
for the initial sample, which suggests no evidence of exuberance in the initial data. This feature
is maintained until June 1995. In July 1995, the test detects the presence of exuberance in the
data, and the evidence in support of price exuberance becomes stronger from this point on and
peaks in February 2000. The exuberance is detected as continuing until February 2001, and by
March 2001, there is little evidence of exuberance in the data. In April 2001, the evidence of
exuberance shows up again in the data and persists until July 2001. In August 2001, no further
evidence of exuberance is present in the data.
Interestingly, the first occurrence date for price exuberance in the data is July 1995, which
is more than one year before Greenspan’s historic remark of “irrational exuberance” made in
December 1996.
Following a suggestion of the referees, we checked the robustness of the empirical results
by running rolling regressions, in which each regression is based on a subsample of size (N)
of smaller order than n and with the initialization rolling forward. For this particular data, we
choose N = 77, which is 20% of the full sample, and hence the first sample period is from
Feburary 1973 to June 1979.14 Figure 4 plots the rolling recursive ADFr statistic for the log
real price and the log real dividend. Also plotted is the 5% asymptotic critical value.15 As
does the test based on forward recursive regression, the test based the rolling regressions
detects explosiveness in price in the 1990s. In particular, the test indicates that exuberance in
the 1990s starts in July 1995 and ends in September 2000. The estimated origination date is
the same as in Figure 3. So the empirical identification of exuberance in the 1990s and the
13 Ng and Perron (1995) demonstrate that too parsimonious a model can have large size distortions, whereas an
overparameterized model may result in reduction of test power. They show that methods based on sequential tests have
an advantage over information-based rules because the former have less size distortions and have comparable power.
14 Two alternative moving window sizes, N = 60 and 120 (5 and 10 years, respectively) were tried and very similar
results were obtained.
15 Although the sample size is fixed at 77 in all the rolling regressions, the asymptotic critical values are very close to
the critical values when the sample size is 77.
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TABLE 2
TESTING FOR EXPLOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE NASDAQ INDEX IN THE 1990S
ADF1 supr∈[r0,1] ADFr δˆ
LS δˆII 95% Confidence Interval
Panel A: Sample Period: January 1990 to December 1999
Log price pt 2.309 2.894 1.025 1.033 [1.016, 1.050]
Log dividend dt −8.140 −1.626 0.258
Panel B: Sample Period: January 1990 to June 2000
Log price pt 2.975 2.975 1.036 1.040 [1.033, 1.047]
Log dividend dt −8.600 −1.626 0.204
Critical Values for the Explosive Alternative
1% 0.60 2.094
4% 0.01 1.552
5% −0.08 1.468
10% −0.44 1.184
NOTE: This table reports ADF1 and supr∈[r0,1] ADFr tests of the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of
an explosive root, where r0 = 0.10. The optimal lag length for theADF test is selected according to top-down sequential
significance testing, as suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991), with the maximum lag set to 12 and the significant
level set to 5%. The series are the log real Nasdaq price index and log real Nasdaq dividend. Panel A reports the results
for the period January 1990 to December 1999; Panel B reports the results for the period January 1990 to June 2000
when explosive behavior is detected to be the strongest. The critical values for the ADF statistic and supr∈[r0,1] ADFr
are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications.
empirically determined date of origination of exuberance appear robust to the choice of the
regression schemes. However, the estimated collapse date is a few months earlier in the data.
Interestingly, the new test also detects some explosive behavior before the 1987 crash, although
this exuberance is very short-lived.16
To highlight the explosive behavior in the Nasdaq during the 1990s, we carry out the analysis
using two subsamples. The first subsample is from January 1990 to December 1999, the 10-year
period that recent researchers have focused on (e.g., Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2006; Ofek and
Richardson, 2003; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). Panel A of Table 2 reports the test results.
As above, we apply the ADF1 and supr ADFr tests for a unit root against the alternative of
an explosive root to both the log real price and log real dividend series.17 We also obtain the
least squares estimate δˆLS, the indirect inference estimate δˆII , the 95% asymptotic confidence
interval of δ based on δˆII , and critical values for the unit root tests.
All the results give strong evidence of explosiveness in pt. For example, for the log realNasdaq
price index, theADF1 statistic for the full sample is 2.309, far exceeding the 1% critical value of
0.60. Similar results occur with the supr ADFr test. We therefore reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root at the 1% significance level in favor of explosive behavior for the Nasdaq stock index.
In contrast, there is no evidence that the log real dividend series exhibits explosive behavior.18
Figure 5 graphs the trajectory of the ADFr statistics together with log(log(ns))/100, with
s ∈ [0.1, 1] and n = 186, as the critical values for sample observations from January 1990 to the
end of the sample. As for the full sample, we choose r0 = 0.10. Similar to Figures 4 and 5, we
again date the start of price exuberance in July 1995, so the empirically determined date of
origination of the exuberance appears robust to the choice of the initial sample. The recursive
16 Also, the nonmonotonicity inADFr for the 1990 episode in Figure 4 ismore apparent than in Figure 3. For example,
we find weak evidence of a unit root in January 1997 and in August-October 1998, where the ADFr statistic is slightly
smaller than the corresponding critical values at these dates.
17 The lag length J chosen by sequential testing for ADF1 is J = 0 for both the log price and log dividend series.
18 The 5% and 1% critical values for a unit root against the stationary alternative are −2.86 and −3.42, respectively.
Based on these critical values, the ADF1 test will indeed reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in favor of the
alternative of stationarity for the dividend series.
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FIGURE 5
TIME SERIES OF ADFr T-STATISTIC FOR THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ PRICE AND THE LOGARITHMIC REAL NASDAQ DIVIDEND
(r0 = 0.1) FROM JUNE 1991 TO JUNE 2005. ADFr T-STATISTIC IS OBTAINED FROM THE FORWARD RECURSIVE REGRESSION WITH
THE FIRST OBSERVATION IN JANUARY 1990
regressions detect the conclusion of exuberance in October 2000, somewhat earlier than that
reported in Figure 3 but very similar to that reported in Figure 4.
The autoregression gives the AR coefficient estimate δˆLS = 1.025 in stock price. Assuming
that the error term in the regression follows an i.i.d. normal distribution and J = 0, we obtain the
indirect inference estimate δˆII = 1.033 via simulation with 10,000 replications. The associated
95% asymptotic confidence interval for δ is [1.016, 1.050]. This implies that the log stock price pt
will grow at the explosive rate of 3.3% per month. Since the dividend series dt is not explosive,
with a constant discount rate the fundamental price pft is also not explosive, being determined
exclusively by dividends according to (3). Therefore, from (2), bt (the log bubble) must also be
explosive with a growth rate at least as high as the growth rate of stock price, g = 3.3% per
month. With 95% confidence, the true growth rate g lies in the range between 1.6% and 5%
per month. Under the assumption of constant discount rate, this provides sufficient conditions
for the presence of bubble.
To understand the implication of the estimated explosive rate for stock price, suppose that
the Nasdaq index were overvalued by around 10% when Greenspan made his “irrational
exuberance” comment in December 1996. Then the initial size of the log bubble would be
b0 = log(P0/Pf0 ) = log(1.10) = 0.0953 in December 1996. Using the indirect inference estimate
of the growth rate g = 0.033, we may calculate that, by March 2000 when the Nasdaq index
reached its historic high (39months later), the expected log level of the price bubble would have
risen to bt = (1 + 0.033)39 × 0.0953 = 0.338, and the ratio of the expected Nasdaq price to its
fundamental value would have beenPt/P
f
t = exp(bt) = exp(0.338) = 1.40. In other words, after
39 months, the expected Nasdaq index would have become around 40% overvalued relative to
its fundamental.
Notice that δˆII = 1.033 reported in Panel A of Table 2 gives an unbiased estimate of the
explosive root for the stock price process pt, which can be considered a lower bound of the
explosive root of the unobservable bubble process bt. The reason is as follows. From (2),
we know that the actual stock price consists of the fundamental component and the bubble
component. Under the assumption that the fundamental component is either I(1) or I(0) and
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the bubble component is explosive, if a bubble lasts for a sufficiently long period of time, the
bubble component will dominate the fundamental component and the actual stock price will
grow at around the same speed as the bubble component does. However, within a limited time
period when a bubble is first developing, the magnitude of the bubble component may be small
relative to the fundamental component even though the process is explosive, and therefore
employing the stock price series for estimation will underestimate the true growth rate of the
bubble.
To provide a more realistic estimate of the growth rate of the bubble, since the Nasdaq index
kept rising after December 1999, we implement theADF1 test by extending the first subsample
to June 2000 when the test detects explosive price behavior with the most significant ADF
test statistic. Panel B of Table 2 reports the least squares estimate for this sample, δˆLS = 1.036,
which yields the indirect inference estimate δˆII = 1.040.19 This implies a growth rate g = 4%per
month. Although this is still a lower bound estimate of the growth rate of the bubble process, it
is plausible to think of it as the closest to the true growth rate.
Suppose that the Nasdaq index were overvalued by 10% when our test first detected the
bubble to start in June 1995; then the initial size of the bubble is b0 = log(P0/Pf0 ) = log(1.10) =
0.0953.Using the above unbiased estimate of the speed of bubble, by June 2000 (60months later)
when our test detected the bubble to be the strongest, the expected size of the bubble would
have become bt = (1 + 0.04)60 × 0.0953 = 1.0025. This implies that the ratio of the expected
Nasdaq price to its fundamental value would have been Pt/P
f
t = exp(bt) = exp(1.0025) = 2.73.
In other words, the expected value of the Nasdaq index would have been 173% overpriced
relative to its fundamental value after 60 months.20 The actual Nasdaq index peaked at 5,048.62
points on March 10, 2000, then dropped to 1,950.4 by December 31, 2001 and to 1,335.31 by
December 31, 2002. If the year 2001 end value is considered close to the “fundamental” value,
then the Nasdaq index would be 159% overpriced at the peak (5049/1950 = 2.59). On the other
hand, if the year 2002 end value is considered the “fundamental” value, the peak value would
be 278% overpriced (5049/1335 = 3.78). Therefore, the above estimate of the growth rate of
the bubble matches the actual Nasdaq price dynamics reasonably well.
6. FINITE SAMPLE PROPERTIES
6.1. Unit Root Tests for an Explosive Bubble. Although standard unit root tests have been
applied to test for unit roots against explosiveness in the price series pt in Diba and Grossman
(1988) and Evans (1991), both papers only examined the finite sample performance of the
standard unit root tests for the bubble bt (see Section VI in Diba and Grossman and Section III
in Evans). Naturally, however, it is more informative to verify the finite sample performance
of the standard unit root tests in the price series itself pt because in practice the price series is
observed but the bubble series is not.
Consider the following data-generating process, where the fundamental price follows a ran-
dom walk with drift and the bubble process is a linear explosive process without collapsing:
pt = pft + bt, pft = μf + pft−1 + εf ,t,(22)
bt = (1 + g)bt−1 + εb,t,(23)
where εf ,t ∼ NID(0, σ2f ), and εb,t ∼ NID(0, σ2b ).We useNasdaq price index data fromFebruary
1973 to December 1989 (i.e., before the 1990s explosive price period started) to estimate the
19 The lag length J chosen by sequential testing for ADF1 is J = 5 for the log price series and J = 0 for the log
dividend series.
20 The OLS estimate, 1.036, implies only 121% overpriced index level. Hence, the compounding effect arisen from
the estimation bias is economically significant.
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TABLE 3
POWER OF THE ADF1 TEST
Panel A
Initial Value b0 g = 0.00 (size) g = 0.01 g = 0.02 g = 0.03 g = 0.04
0.00 0.049 0.107 0.458 0.806 0.934
0.02 0.049 0.111 0.464 0.810 0.937
0.04 0.049 0.115 0.476 0.818 0.935
0.06 0.049 0.119 0.495 0.828 0.951
0.08 0.049 0.125 0.522 0.848 0.954
0.10 0.049 0.134 0.550 0.866 0.961
Panel B
Initial Value b0 σb = 0.005 σb = 0.01 σb = 0.02 σb = 0.03 σb = 0.04
0.00 0.652 0.817 0.901 0.930 0.942
0.02 0.822 0.851 0.905 0.933 0.944
0.04 0.972 0.911 0.924 0.934 0.948
0.06 0.999 0.962 0.936 0.945 0.950
0.08 1.000 0.988 0.953 0.952 0.955
0.10 1.000 0.998 0.968 0.961 0.961
NOTE: This table reports the empirical power of the ADF test for an explosive stock market bubble at the 5% nominal
size level with 120 observations and 10,000 Monte Carlo replications. The model used for the experiment is pt =
pft + bt, pft = μ + pft−1 + εf ,t and, bt = (1 + g)bt−1 + εb,t , with parameter values μ = 0.00227, σf = 0.05403, and σb =
0.0324 estimated based on the Nasdaq price index data as described in the text. These parameter values are used
to conduct simulations under different assumptions about the speed parameter g and the initial level of the bubble
process b0. Results are reported in Panel A. Panel B displays results with different values assigned to b0 and the bubble
innovation standard deviation σb when the speed parameter g is set to its empirically fitted value of 0.04.
fundamental process, assuming that there was no bubble during this period so that pt = pft . This
estimation yields the values μf = 0.00227 and σf = 0.05403. We then use these two parameter
values along with g = 0.04 (based on the indirect inference estimate of δ in Panel B of Table 2)
to obtain the estimate of the bubble innovation σb = 0.0324 by employing data for the explosive
period January 1990 to June 2000 via the Kalman filter, as in Wu (1997). These parameters
μf , σf , and σb are used to conduct simulations under different assumptions about the speed
parameter g and the initial level of the bubble b0 with 120 observations and 10,000 replications.
The simulation results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. Panel B displays the results for
different values for the bubble innovation standard deviation σb, whereas the speed parameter
g is set to 0.04, which is the indirect inference estimate of δ − 1 reported in Panel B of Table 2.
It is known from Diba and Grossman (1988) that standard unit tests can detect explosive
characteristics in bt. Our simulation results suggest that the standard unit root tests can also de-
tect the explosive characteristics in pt when bubbles appear in the empirically realistic settings
as long as the bubbles are not periodically collapsing. Panel A of Table 3 clearly demonstrates
that the higher the test power is, the larger is the growth rate g and/or the larger is the initial-
ization b0. When the growth rate g is larger than 0.01, the test has substantial power against
the explosive alternative, and when g = 0.04 (the indirect inference estimate using the Nasdaq
stock index during the bubbly period), the test has nearly perfect power against the explosive-
ness alternative regardless of the initial level of the bubble b0. Panel B of Table 3 shows that
smaller values of the standard deviation σb lead to greater test power provided the initial value
b0 is not too small (here b0 > 0.03). Overall, the power is not very sensitive to the innovation
standard deviation σb or to the initial value of the bubble b0 and is quite high with the growth
rate g = 0.04.
220 PHILLIPS, WU, AND YU
6.2. Recursive Unit Root Tests and Periodically Collapsing Bubbles. The above simulation
design does not allow for the possibility of periodically collapsing bubbles, an important class
of bubbles that seem more relevant in practical economic and financial applications. Evans
(1991) proposed a model to simulate such collapsing bubbles and showed that standard unit
root tests had little power to detect this type of bubbles. In this section, we first design a
simulation experiment to assess the capacity of our recursive regression tests to detect this
type of periodically collapsing bubbles. We show that although the tests are inconsistent in the
context, in finite samples the tests have good power.
Evans (1991) suggested the following model for a bubble process Bt that collapses periodi-
cally:21
Bt+1 = (1 + g)Btεb,t+1, if Bt ≤ α,(24)
Bt+1 = [ζ + π−1(1 + g)θt+1
(
Bt − (1 + g)−1ζ
)
]εb,t+1, if Bt > α,(25)
where g > 0, εb,t = exp(yt − τ2/2) with yt ∼ NID(0, τ2), θt is an exogenous Bernoulli process
that takes the value 1 with probability π and 0 with probability 1 − π. Evans (1991) specifies
his model in levels and so price, dividend, and bubble are in levels and are expressed in upper-
case letters. This model has the property that Bt+1 satisfies Et(Bt+1) = (1 + g)Bt, analogous
to (4). The model generates bubbles that survive as long as the initial bounding condition
Bt ≤ α applies (say t ≤ Tα) and thereafter only as long as the succession of identical realizations
θTα+k = 1,k = 1, 2, . . . , hold. The bubble bursts when θt = 0.
To facilitate comparisons between our simulation results with those of Evans (1991), we
use the same simulation design and parameter settings as his. In particular, a bubble process
Bt of 100 observations is simulated from the model (24) and (25) with the parameter settings
g = 0.05, α = 1, ζ = 0.5,B0 = 0.5, and τ = 0.05, and θt is a Bernoulli process that takes the value
1 with probability π and 0 with probability 1 − π. When θt = 0, the bubble bursts. We choose
the value π = 0.999, 0.99, 0.95, 0.85, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25. In addition, a dividend series (in levels) of
100 observations is simulated from the following random walk model with drift:
Dt = μD + Dt−1 + εd,t, εb,t ∼ NID(0, σ2d ),
where μD = 0.0373, σ2d = 0.1574,D0 = 1.3. Consequently, the fundamental price is generated
from
Pft = μD(1 + g)g−2 + Dt/g,
and the simulated price series follows as Pt = Pft + Bt. In the simulations reported, Bt is scaled
upwards by a factor of 20, as suggested in Evans (1991).
Table 4 reports the empirical power of the ADF1 and supr ADFr statistics for testing an
explosive bubble based on the 5% critical value reported in Table 1 and 10,000 replications.
We should emphasize that, unlike Evans (1991), who assumed that Bt is observed and tested
the explosiveness in Bt, we apply the ADF1 test to the price series itself Pt. Several interesting
results emerge from the table. First, the power of the ADF1 test depends critically on π. When
π = 0.999 or 0.99, the ADF1 test has considerably good power (0.914 and 0.460 respectively).
When π ≤ 0.95, theADF1 test has essentially no power. These results are consistent with those
reported in Evans (1991, table 1). Second, the power of the supr ADFr statistic also depends
on π, but in a much less drastic way. For example, when π = 0.25, it still has considerable
21 Blanchard (1979), Flood and Garber (1980), and Blanchard and Watson (1982) first proposed stochastic bubbles
that can burst with a fixed probability. Burmeister et al. (1983) show the equivalence of a class of different-looking
stochastic bubble processes.
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TABLE 4
POWER OF THE ADF1 AND supr∈[r0,1] ADFr TESTS UNDER THE EVANS (1991) MODEL
π 0.999 0.99 0.95 0.85 0.75 0.50 0.25
ADF1 0.914 0.460 0.069 0.022 0.016 0.026 0.044
supr∈[r0,1] ADFr 0.992 0.927 0.714 0.432 0.351 0.342 0.340
NOTE: This table reports the empirical power of the ADF test for an explosive bubble at the 5% nominal size level with
100 observations and 10,000 Monte-Carlo replications. The model used for the experiment is Pt = Pft + 20Bt where
Pft = μ(1 + g)g−2 + Dt/g with Dt = μ + Dt−1 + εd,t, εb,t ∼ NID(0, σ2d ) and Bt collapses periodically according to
Bt+1 = (1 + g)Btεb,t+1, if Bt ≤ α,
Bt+1 = [ζ + π−1(1 + g)θt+1(Bt − (1 + g)−1ζ)]εb,t+1, if Bt > α,
with g > 0, εb,t = exp(yt − τ2/2), yt ∼ NID(0, τ2), θt being a Bernoulli process that takes the value 1 with probability
π and 0 with probability 1 − π. We set g = 0.05, α = 1, ζ = 0.5,B0 = 0.5, τ = 0.05, μ = 0.0373, σ2d = 0.1574,D0 = 1.3.
We choose different values for π.
power (0.340). For empirically more relevant cases, say when π = 0.95, the power of supr ADFr
becomes much higher (0.714).
Clearly the performance of the tests is determined by the time span of a bubble. In the
Appendix, we formally show that the maximum time span of a collapsing bubble in Evans’
(1991) model isOp (logn), which is very short relative to the full sample size n, so that standard
unit root tests cannot be expected to perform very well. This Appendix further shows that in
a regression of Bt+1 on Bt with Op (logn) observations from an explosive period, the signal in
the regression has the maximum order of Op (n2 log(
1+g
π
)− τ22 ). When log( 1+g
π
) < 1 + τ24 , this signal
is smaller than that of an integrated process whose signal is Op (n2) and significantly less than
that of an explosive process. These findings explain the failure of conventional unit root tests to
detect bubbles of this type, confirming the simulations in Evans (1991) and in our Table 4.
In recursive regressions, the signal will be comparatively stronger because the data set is
shorter and it will be emphasized when the end point in the recursion occurs toward the end
of a bubble. This argument suggests that there will be some statistical advantage to the use of
recursive regression techniques and the use of a sup test in assessing the evidence for periodically
collapsing bubbles, as confirmed in Table 4. However, in a recursive regression using samples
of size τ = [nr] for r > 0, the maximum length of the bubble is stillOp (log n) and this is still not
long enough relative to nr for a recursive test to be consistent essentially because the signal is
not strong enough. This limitation shows up in the simulations as the test performs worse when
π gets smaller, although the power for the sup test is clearly nontrivial and substantially better
than that of conventional tests. We might expect some additional gain from the use of a rolling
regression in conducting the test, where the sample size (N) used for the regression has smaller
order than n, for instance, N = [nη] for some γ < 1, or even N = O(log n). When N = [nη], for
instance, the signal from the explosive part of the data, which still has the time span ofOp (log n),
will dominate provided that η < 2 log( 1+g
π
) − τ22 . However, in the case of rolling regressions of
this type, tests generally have different limit distributions from those studied already in the
unit root and structural break literature, for example by Banerjee et al. (1993), where rolling
regressions of length proportional to the sample size n are used.
7. CONCLUSION
This article has proposed a new approach to testing for explosive behavior in stock prices that
makes use of recursive regression, right-sided unit root tests, and a new method of confidence
interval construction for the growth parameter in stock market exuberance. Simulations reveal
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that the approach works well in finite samples and has discriminatory power to detect explosive
processes and periodically collapsing bubbles when the discount rate is time invariant.
The empirical application of these methods to the Nasdaq experience in the 1990s confirms
the existence of exuberance and date stamps its origination and collapse. As the second epi-
graph indicates, the existence of exuberance or “bubble” activity may be self-evident to some
economists in view of the sheer size of the wealth created and subsequently destroyed in the
Nasdaq market. Of primary interest therefore are its particular characteristics such as the orig-
ination date, which we find to be mid-1995, the peak in February 2000, and the conclusion
sometime between September 2000 and March 2001. Comparison of this statistical origination
to the timing of the famous remark by Greenspan in December 1996 affirms that Greenspan’s
perceptions were actually supported by empirical evidence of exuberance in the data at that
time.
Greenspan’s remarks are often taken to indicate foresight concerning the subsequent path
of Nasdaq stocks. The present findings indicate that his remarks were also supported in some
measure by the track record of empirical experience up to that time. Thus, Greenspan’s per-
spective concerning irrational exuberance in stock prices and future profitability in December
1996 showed hindsight as well as foresight concerning the impending escalation in technology
asset values.
This article has not attempted to identify explicit sources of the 1990s exuberance in internet
stocks. Several possibilities exist, including the presence of a rational bubble, herd behavior,
or explosive effects on economic fundamentals arising from time variation in discount rates.
Identification of the explicit economic source or sourceswill involvemore explicit formulation of
the alternative models and suitable model determination techniques to empirically distinguish
between suchmodels. Thepresent econometricmethodology showshow thedatamaybe studied
as a mildly explosive propagating mechanism. The results confirm strong empirical support for
such activity in the Nasdaq data over the 1990s. The methodology can also be applied to study
recent phenomena in real estate, commodity, foreign exchange, and equity markets, which have
attracted attention. The results will be reported in future work.
APPENDIX: PROPERTIES OF EVANS’S (1991) MODEL
We may write the initial stopping time Tα for which the boundary value α is attained as
Tα = inf
t
{t : Bt ≥ α} .
Subsequent stopping times are determined in the same way after the initial bubble collapses.
The duration of each of the bubbles depends on these stopping times plus the number of
repeated subsequent draws of θTα+1 = 1. It is known (e.g., Schilling, 1990) that the maximum
run time, Rn, for a sequence of identical Bernoulli draws in a sample of size n has mean
E(Rn) = O(log1/π{n(1 − π)}) = O( log{n(1−π)}log 1
π
) and variance Var(Rn) = π26 log2( 1
π
)
. It follows that
Rn = Op (logn). Hence, the maximum time span of a collapsing bubble over the full sample will
be Tα + Rn = Tα + Op (logn). To determine the length of the stopping time Tα, observe that
the condition in (24) requires
BTα = (1 + g)Tα B0
Tα∏
s=1
us = (1 + g)Tα B0
Tα∏
s=1
eys−
1
2 τ
2 ≤ α,
which holds if
Tα log (1 + g) + logB0 +
Tα∑
s=1
(
ys − 12τ
2
)
≤ logα,
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or
Tα
{
log (1 + g) − τ
2
2
}
+
Tα∑
s=1
ys ≤ logα − logB0.
Writing
∑Tα
s=1 ys = τW (Tα) where W is a standard Brownian motion, this condition can be
rewritten as
W (Tα) + μTα ≤ A,(A.1)
where
μ = 1
τ
log (1 + g) − τ
2
, A = 1
τ
{
logα − logB0
}
.
The time span Tα of the first component in the bubble (24) is therefore the passage time until a
standard Brownian motion W (t) with drift μ hits the boundary value A. That is
Tα = inf
s
{W(s) + μs ≥ A}.(A.2)
It is well known (e.g., Borodin and Salminen, 1996, p. 223) that this passage time satisfies
P (Tα = ∞) = 1 − eμA−|μA|,
and, since for small values of τ andwithB0 < 1we haveμ,A > 0, it follows thatP (Tα = ∞) = 0.
Also, Tα has moment generating function (Borodin and Salminen, 1996, p. 223)
E(e−gTα) = eμA−|A|{2g+μ2}1/2 ,
so that the expected hitting time
E (Tα) = |Aμ| eμA−|Aμ| = Aμ = A
{
1
τ
log (1 + g) − τ
2
}
is finite, as is the variance. It follows that the maximum time span of a collapsing bubble
generated by (24) and (25) over the full sample is Tα + Rn = Op (logn) and, in general, the
time span will be shorter than Tα + Rn because the maximum run time Rn will not usually be
attained.
This finding explains the failure of conventional unit root tests to detect bubbles of this type,
confirming the simulations in Evans (1991). In effect, even themaximum time span ofOp (logn)
for these collapsing bubbles is so short relative to the full sample size n that full sample tests for
explosive behavior are inconsistent. Heuristically, this is because the signal from the explosive
part of the trajectory is generally not strong enough to dominate the regression before the
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bubble collapses. In particular, if data {Bt}nt=1 were available, the signal from an explosive
period initialized at T0 and of duration Tα + Rn in the regression of Bt+1 on Bt has order
Op
⎛⎝Tα+Rn+T0∑
t=T0
B2t
⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Tαα2 + Rn+T0∑
t=T0+Tα+1
B2t
⎞⎠ = Op
⎛⎝ Rn+T0∑
t=T0+Tα+1
⎧⎨⎩
(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2
T0+Tα+Rn∏
s=T0+Tα+1
us
⎫⎬⎭
⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
⎧⎨⎩
(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2
T0+Tα+Rn∏
s=T0+Tα+1
us
⎫⎬⎭
⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
⎧⎨⎩
(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2 exp
⎡⎣ T0+Tα+Rn∑
s=T0+Tα+1
ys − Rn τ
2
2
⎤⎦⎫⎬⎭
⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
⎧⎨⎩
(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2 exp
⎡⎣ T0+Tα+Rn∑
s=T0+Tα+1
ys − Rn τ
2
2
⎤⎦⎫⎬⎭
⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
{(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2 exp
[
τ
{
W (T0 + Tα + Rn) − W (T0 + Tα)
}− Rn τ22
]}⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
{(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2 exp
[
Op
(√
Rn
)
− Rn τ
2
2
]}⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
{(
1 + g
π
)2t
α2 exp
[
−τ
2
2
logn
]}⎞⎠
= Op
⎛⎝Rn+T0+Tα∑
t=T0+Tα+1
(
1 + g
π
)2t⎞⎠× Op (e− τ22 log n) = Op
((
1 + g
π
)2Rn)
× Op
(
e−
τ2
2 log n
)
= Op
(
n2 log(
1+g
π )− τ
2
2
)
,
(A.3)
since Rn = Op (logn). The signal from a stationary autoregression is Op (n) and from a unit
root autoregression is Op (n2) so that the signal from the explosive component above will be of
maximal order Op (n2 log(
1+g
π
)− τ22 ), which is still a power law in n and no greater than that of an
integrated process, whose signal is Op (n2), when
log
(
1 + g
π
)
<
1
2
+ τ
2
4
,
and no greater than that of a polynomial in an integrated process in general, thereby excluding
explosive behavior.
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